At issue was whether damage caused by a crane landing on a building during a tropical storm was covered as an ensuing loss.  See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Chabad Lubavitch of Greater Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8403 (Fla. Ct. App. June 8, 2011).

   The insured had two policies on the damaged building.  The first was an "all risk" policy issued by Lloyd's.  It included a "Windstorm or Hail Exclusion," which provided that if a loss or damage was caused by a windstorm the loss was not covered, regardless of any other cause or event that contributed to the loss.  The exclusion had an ensuing loss provision, however, which stated that if a windstorm "results in a cause of loss other than rain, snow, sand or dust, and that resulting cause of loss is a Covered Cause of Loss," the loss would be covered.  An example of the applicability of the ensuing loss provision was given: "[I]f the Windstorm or Hail damages a heating system and fire results, the loss or damage attributable to the fire is covered subject to any other applicable policy provisions."

   The second policy covered wind damage ("wind policy").  The insured claimed under this policy and received policy limits.

   Lloyd's filed suit for a declaratory judgment that the all risk policy's windstorm exclusion provision excluded coverage for the damage caused by the wind generated during the storm.  Both parties moved for summary judgment. Lloyd's argued that the insured's submission of a claim under the wind policy constituted an admission that the loss was caused by wind, and was consequently excluded. The insured countered that the crane striking the building was the cause of damage, not wind.  The trial court concluded that the windstorm exclusion was ambiguous and should be strictly construed against Lloyd's to cover the damage to the building.

   The appellate noted the plain language of the ensuing loss provision meant that if a windstorm set in motion another cause, which was not excluded by the policy, and that intervening cause resulted in a covered loss, the windstorm exception did not apply and the loss would be covered.  Therefore, the windstorm exclusion was unambiguous.

   However, the cause of the crane's falling was not determined by the trial court.  This factual determination was critical because the exclusion would only apply if the crane fell from its perch because of the force of the wind, aided only by gravity and not some other intervening cause.  Consequently, the case was remanded. 

   The dissent felt the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous.  A crane falling into the building was "a cause of loss other than rain, snow, sand or dust."  Therefore, the dissent would have affirmed summary judgment for the insured.