The insureds were denied coverage when both negligent and intentional acts took place in the underlying case. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Diblin. 114 Cal. App. 5th 1245 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025).

Curtis Diblin held a homeowners policy with State Farm. While the policy was in effect, Dibiln attacked his housemate, Monee Gagliardo, by striking her over the head with a mallet multiple times. Dibiln was criminally prosecuted and ultimately pled guilty to one count of assault with intent to commit a sexual crime.

Gagliardo then sued Diblin for sexual assault, secual battery, sexual harassment and negligence. Diblin tendered the underling action to State ‘Frm. State Farm agreed to defend under a reservation of rights. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury which was (1) either expected or inteneded by the insured, or (2) the result of willful and malicious acts of the insured.

In the underlying case, the jury found in Gagilardo’s favor on two theories of liability: (1) that Diblin had committed an act of gender violence against Gagliardo, and (2) that he acted negligently, which caused her harm. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $2,514,500. The parties then settled with Diblin assigning to Gagilardo his policy and bad faith claims against State Farm.

State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory relief against Gagliardo and Diblin. The trail court found State Farm had no duty to indemnify. Diblin’s liability did not arise from an occurrence. The jury’s verdict established that it found Diblin acted intentionally when he injured Gagliardo.

Diblin and Gagilardo appealed. They argued the jury’s finding that Diblin was negligent necessitated a finding that the damages awarded in the underlying action were covered.

The appellate court noted that the jury’s finding that Diblin commtited gender violence was a finding that he committed an intentional tort. The jury also found that Diblin acted with both malice and oppression in injuring Gagilardo. The appellants contended that because the jury also made a finding Diblin was negligent, the jury must have concluded Gagliardo’s injuries were caused unintentionally. They argued that only the negligence finding – and not the gender violence finding- should be given preclusive effect.

The court disagreed .There was no inconsistency in the jury’s findings that Diblin was liable for Gagliardo’s injuries under both an intentional tort theory and a negligence theory. The verdict form and the jury instructions confirmed that the jury believed Diblin’s injury-producing conduct was deliberate and intentional and that this deliberate conduct constitted a breach of the duty of care Diblin owed to Gagilardo. The jury’s negligence determination did not mandate a finding of coverage. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.