The court denied the insured’s motion for summary judgment finding genuine issues of fact regarding implication of the policy’s ensuing loss provision. Stella Prop. Dev.. & Event Productions, LLC v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15854 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2026).

Stella owned a cultural center that was insured under a commercial property all-risk policy issued by Auto-Owners. A windstorm with gusts of 65 miles per hour struck the Center causing damage. The Center’s inspector found extensive wind damage on nearly all facets of the roof. Further, the inspector found the existing organic shingles were in “very poor condition” and were “defective, discontinued, and no longer available.” The estimated cost of repairs to the roof was $108,010.52.

Stella submitted a claim to Auto-Owners. An investigation by Auto-Owners found that the shingles appeared to be over 25 years old and in very poor condition. Further, the asphalt shingles were not damaged by a single wind event and the conditions on the roof – “flaking granules and clawing and splitting overlay of organic shingles” – were “typical forms of long-term deterioration of organic shingles.”

Auto-Owners denied the claim relying on exclusions for wear and tear and inadequate maintenance. Stella filed suit alleging breach of contract and bad faith. Stella moved for summary judgment. Auto-Owners moved for partial summary judgment to challenge the bad faith claim.

Auto-Owners argued Stella’s motion was inappropriate because there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to the condition of the roof before the windstorm, including whether the roof had been inadequately maintained and whether it was already worn and torn.

Stella argued the efficient proximate cause rule applied, meaning there was coverage under the policy when the loss was caused by a covered peril, even though other excluded perils contributed to the loss. The court found that under the doctrine, Stella still had to prove that the windstorm was the “dominant and efficient’ cause of the roof’s destruction, as opposed to merely a “remote” or ‘incidental” cause. Here, the record contained competing evidence proffered to show from which of the concurrent causes the loss resulted. This was a determination for the jury.

Stella next argued that even if the efficient proximate cause did not mandate coverage as a matter of law, coverage existed because the exclusions relied upon by Auto-Owners each included an ensuing loss provision. The wear and tear exclusion stated that if an excluded cause of loss “results in a ‘specified cause of loss'” . . . [Auto-Owners] will pay for the loss or damage caused by that ‘specified’ cause of loss. “Specified causes of loss” included windstorm.

Stella argued that if an excluded condition and a covered peril combined to produce a single loss, the loss was covered. The court agreed with Auto-Owners interpretation. The policy defined “specified cause of loss” as a list of perils – “fire, lightning, explosion, windstorm or hail” – not as “damage caused by” a peril. The ensuing loss clause applied when an excluded condition resulted in the peril itself, and the policy then paid for “the loss or damage caused by that” ensuing loss. So the provision would read, “[I]f [wear and tear] . . . results in a [windstorm]. . . we will for the loss or damage caused by that [windstorm].” The language unambiguously did not cover the scenario here – assumed by Stella for purposes of their motion – in which wear and tear merely made the roof more susceptible to wind damage but did not “result in” the windstorm itself.

Nor did the text of the maintenance exclusion and its attendant ensuing-loss clause come to Stella’s aid. The exclusion stated if inadequate maintenance “results in a Covered Cause of Loss, [Auto-Owners] will pay for the loss or damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss.” The term “risk” in the phrase “Risks of Direct Physical Loss’ “referred to the peril or hazard that may cause a loss, not to the loss itself. For the ensuing loss provision to apply, the excluded condition had to “result in” an otherwise covered peril that then caused separate loss or damage. In this case, inadequate maintenance could bear on how the roof performed under windy conditions, but it did not “result in” a windstorm.

Therefore, Stella’s motion for summary judgment was denied,

The court went on to grant Auto-Owners’ motion for partial summary judgment on Stella’s bad faith claim. There was no indication that Auto-Owners took an unreasonable position.