The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding it had no duty to indemnify the additional insured nor to continue its defense of the additional insured. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Budrovich Indoor Training I, LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133776 (E.D. Mo. June 16, 2026).

Budrovich Indoor Training leased to tenants a facility for Volleyball tournaments. Budrovich leased part of the facility to St. Louis Crossfire Elite Volleyball Club, a company that hosted volleyball tournaments. The lease required Crossfire to secure an insurance policy naming Budrovich as an additional insured. Crossfire obtained such a policy from West Bend Mutual Insurance Company.

A minor, A.N., participated in a volleyball tournament on Budrovich’s property. A.N. was injured when she tripped over an unmarked chain barrier strung across a driveway in the parking lot. A.N. and her mother filed suit alleging that Budrovich negligently caused A.N.’s injury.

Budrovich tendered the defense to West Bend. A defense was provided under a reservation of rights. Subsequently, West Bend advised Budrovich that after investigating the case, the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify Budrovich. West Bend then filed for a declaratory judgment to determine its rights under the policy.

The court first addressed West Bend’s duty to indemnify. The policy addressed “Who is an Insured” as follows: “Any additional insured under any policy of ‘underlying insurance’ will automatically be an insured under this insurance.” An endorsement to the policy further defined “additional insured,” stating that a bodily injury must have been “caused in whole or in part by your [Crossfire’s] ongoing operations performed for the insured at the location designated in the written contract.”

Here, Crossfire performed no “ongoing operations for the insured” in the parking areas. The lease designated the areas Crossfire was required to maintain. Neither common areas nor parking areas were so designated. Therefore, the injury was not “caused in whole or in part” by Crossfire’s “ongoing operations performed for the insured at the location designated in the written contract.” The court concluded as a matter of law that West Bend did not have a duty to indemnify Budrovich in the underlying lawsuit.

Turning to West Bend’s duty to defend, the underlying petition alleged no wrongdoing on Crossfire’s part. The court doubted that an additional insured could invoke the duty to defend or indemnify it against a claim brought solely against it, and not against the insured as well. The underlying petition did not allege that the bodily injury was caused by Crossfire at all, let alone its “ongoing operations.” The entire blame for the injury was placed on the chain that A.N. alleged was improperly maintained by Budrovich.

Even if the court determined that West Bend had a duty to defend Budrovich at the outset of the underlying case, that duty would no longer apply at this stage. Under Missouri law, an insurer could undertake the defense of its insured and reserve its right to later disclaim coverage provided it gave the insured notice of a reservation of rights.

Here, West Bend initially agreed to defend under a reservation of rights. It later sent a letter disclaiming coverage after it determined that, based on facts uncovered in its investigation of the case and pursuant to its reservation of rights, it had not duty to defend Budrovich. Accordingly, West Bend withdrew its defense.

The court concluded, as a matter of law, that West Bend did not have a duty to defend Budrovich in the underlying lawsuit.